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Introduction
Resource security issues, despite being around for
centuries, are much debated these days. This essay
considers the resource nexus, i.e., the interlinkages
between the use of various resources. Such inter-
linkages are manifold, as all resources need others for
their production and delivery to final customers. Yet,
planning for future production and management often
is organized in resource silos. With increasing
demand becoming more erratic and uncertain, and
supplies being dependent on some producing
regions under stress, the nexus amplifies single
issues and drives regions toward instability and
conflicts. Our proposition is that these nexus issues
raise new security challenges in different realms, be
it for supply chain security and markets, or be it for
interstate conflicts, or for public services and human
security on the ground. Scholars and analysts thus
should pay attention and search for solutions that
engage with actors in those different realms.
Grappling with the resource nexus is easier said than
done. Some interlinkages are relatively well known
and not yet fully conveyed into action, such as the
water demand for energy production or the water –
energy – food nexus for biofuels. Predominantly,
however, the future demand by the multitude of users
is not taken into account and will become aggravated
by stress multipliers resulting from weather extremes,
climate change, and a number of socio-economic
factors.
Three factors make these resource nexus uncertain-
ties relevant for a geopolitical perspective: first, global
drivers exert considerable pressures on fragile local
management structures and reduce the resilience of
long-standing mechanisms. Second, the intercon-
nectivity of global flows allows local turbulences to
spread farther and faster, with greater risks of impacts
on other resources and outbreaks in other regions.
Third, powerful countries are affected and may not
adhere to principles of a liberal order that have long
characterized international relations.
This essay describes the resource nexus in more
depth in the next section, explaining the scope and
relevance for international business leaders and poli-
cymakers. The paper will analyze water, its interlink-
ages with other resources, and the multitude of
services derived from water, in subsequent steps. It
will address potential socio-economic impacts
resulting from water stress, the human security angle,
transboundary river management issues, and the
potential threats to international shipping lanes.
Written as a discussion paper, our aim is to stimulate
a debate. Recognizing the potential for a “perfect
storm,”1 a confluence and mutual exacerbation of
challenges in these areas in the next few decades, the
contribution also underlines potential opportunities
by addressing common challenges across sectors
and across the realms of markets, interstate relations,
and the people on the ground. Developing a step-by-
step strategy of grasping some opportunities while
establishing capacities to deal with risks and unleash
further action is probably the wider aim of our
approach.
The Resource Nexus 
The simple meaning of what we are calling the
resource nexus should be readily apparent: under-
standing the interconnections between demand for,
production of, and use of multiple natural resources
simultaneously. That these interlinkages exist may
seem painfully obvious. Mesopotamian agriculturalists
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five thousand years ago knew about the ties between
water, fertilizer, land, and energy, and they certainly
knew that the interplay among different inputs would
determine whether there was enough food in their
pots at the end of a growing season. They also under-
stood that weather, population growth, conflict, and
political decisions were additional variables to
consider, and they did not just throw their hands up
in the air and hope for the best, but rather planned,
adapted, and on occasion took up arms. The Stele of
the Vultures, the earliest known monument to a battle,
commemorates a battle over the fertile, irrigated land
that lay between the city-states of Girsu and Umma
in what is now southern Iraq.2 Much more recently,
the ability to cope with such interconnections is part
of the wider debate about “planetary boundaries”
where earth scientists give a warning that some of
such limits might be transgressed and, inter alia,
feature the resources nitrogen, phosphorus, and
freshwater.3
In spite of the intuitive importance of thinking across
the artificial boundaries between different categories
of resources, the structures of governments, corpo-
rations, and the globalized economy more broadly are
not set up to acknowledge, much less make produc-
tive interventions in, the resource nexus. Moreover,
policymakers and business leaders are effectively
discouraged from thinking about the unintended
consequences of the use or production of one
resource on another. 
Take, for example, recent trends in car sales. In
January 2015, automakers sold 1.5 million new vehi-
cles in the United States, 14 percent more than in the
previous January.4 Of those, more than half were
trucks and sport utility vehicles (which saw nearly 20
percent higher sales than the year before),
suggesting that low gasoline prices coupled with a
strong economy are making gas guzzlers attractive
again after years of pallid sales (see Figure 1 on page
41). No serious observer of energy markets views
the precipitous drop in the price of oil since summer
2014 as a trend that will continue—and most see the
price stabilizing and rising over the next few years.
American consumers, though, like consumers else-
where, typically do not consult the International
Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts when thinking about
what car to buy; rather, they make decisions based on
needs, wants, and short-term price signals.
Governments and businesses, though, also treat oil
as if it exists in its own silo, fundamentally distinct
from water, food, minerals, and materials. 
This is where we are not well positioned to under-
stand how such developments cascade beyond just
the increased demand for petroleum that more SUVs
on the road should create. One might expect cheap
oil to cause the markets for biofuels in the U.S.,
European Union (EU), Brazil, and elsewhere are likely
to perform below expectations, with resulting down-
ward pressures on the prices for corn, soybeans,
palm oil, and sugarcane, and less new land being
converted to grow biofuel crops. However, policy
interventions such as the U.S. Renewable Fuel
Standard (RFS) mean that ethanol and biodiesel will
still need to be produced in large quantities, at least
in the U.S. But outside the U.S. and Europe, cheap oil
in some cases is already depressing food prices,
making farmers less likely to plant crops that will be
more costly to produce than their selling price. Will
this cause a Chinese investor to decide against
purchasing and deforesting a plot of land in Indonesia
to plant oil palm trees?  As Ford makes more F-150s
and Porsche more Cayennes to meet demand, they
will be consuming more steel, aluminum, rubber, poly-
ester, leather, and a host of chemical elements, all of
which require in various quantities water, energy, and
land to produce. The automakers and producers of
mined materials will use more water. The increased
demand for cheap oil, brought on in part by more
people driving longer distances in their new SUVs,
will have its own impacts on supplies and prices, as
well as on the environment and the use of other
resources. In varying degrees, each of these micro-
events has implications for the climate and for secu-
rity as well. These are explored below.
The fact of the matter is that we do not understand the
resource nexus very well. Governments and individ-
uals tend to compartmentalize such issues because
their interrelationships are too complicated to capture,
too difficult to model, and too challenging to address.
Yet if the transatlantic community is going to play a
constructive role amid the profound changes in the
global economy, population, and consumption habits,
and in light of the profound threats to livelihoods and
security posed by climate change, better under-
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standing the resource nexus will be of utmost impor-
tance.
A number of academics, policymakers, and others
have in recent years taken up the theme of the
resource nexus, but yet there is little consensus as to
what precisely is meant by the idea. Early conceptu-
alizations from the policy community and think tanks
came out of the 2011 Bonn Nexus Conference,5 by
papers from the Dutch environmental assessment
agency,6 the Transatlantic Academy,7 the European
Union’s development report,8 and Chatham House.9
Most of these reports foreground the ties among
water, food, and energy. A number of academic
studies examined various aspects of the resource
nexus as well,10 including specific facets such as
water and electricity,11 land,12 and geographically
specific cases in South Asia13 and the Middle East
and North Africa.14 In several instances, government
organizations have included resource nexus analysis
in their planning, such as the United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific15 and the U.S. National Intelligence Council,
which identified the food, water, and energy nexus as
one of four “megatrends” in its most recent quadren-
nial “Global Trends” report.16
Figure 2 (page 41) shows the many ways in which key
resources interact. Some nexus issues may be more
obvious than others, such as the connection between
food and water suggests. Others have become more
pressing recently, such as the water inputs needed for
energy production. The implication for decision-
making is that all activities that are intended to
manage a specific resource shall have knowledge
about the estimated inputs needed from other
resources.
If these ideas are gaining some traction in academic
and policy communities, it is nevertheless important
to ask whether this is simply a re-branding of what we
have known for a very long time. In other words, what
is new? Earlier accounts focused attention on phys-
ical scarcity of natural resources: that unregulated
population growth and consumption meant that we
would literally run out of the stuff (“limits to growth”).
Current analysis treats physical scarcity as a second
or third order problem (“planetary boundaries,” see
above). The cases of fossil fuels and minerals are
illustrative. The problem with oil is likely its abundance
rather than its scarcity, as new technologies have
opened up new possibilities from tight oil and gas to
oil sands. The exceedingly low price of oil currently
does not signal that oil is inexhaustible—of course
eventually on present course we will have burned
most of it by some point in the future—but rather that
there is likely very little incentive to make changes
necessary to avoid the alarming impacts related to
climate changes17 that will accompany releasing all
of that carbon into the atmosphere. Minerals such as
rare earths and iron ore are fairly abundant as well.
The issue with scarcity is not so much physical
scarcity (with the notable exception of water in partic-
ular geographic contexts) but rather the scarcities
created by governments, poorly functioning markets,
environmental change, and geopolitical upheavals. It
is probably one of the strengths of the nexus
approach that these governance and security ramifi-
cations are actively addressed rather than implicitly
suggested.
In addition, there have been tectonic shifts18 in the
global economy, political geography, and the envi-
ronment that require us to re-visit nearly all assump-
tions about resources. Humans are a formidable
geophysical force, causing the global climate to
warm, putting more nitrogen into the earth’s system
than the earth does on its own each year,19 likely
causing tectonic activity with oil and gas extraction20
and dam building.21 Further highlighting the law of
unintended consequences, carbon capture and
storage schemes—injecting carbon dioxide into
underground reservoirs to help mitigate climate
change—if put into place may cause more earth-
quakes,22 potentially harming not only lives and prop-
erty but also re-releasing the CO2. Humans have also
drastically altered the earth’s biodiversity. In light of
anthropogenic changes to the environment, some
scientists have waved goodbye to the Holocene and
pronounced a new geological epoch, the
Anthropocene.23 As the U.S. Department of Defense
and many others have argued, climate change itself is
a “threat multiplier.”24 The long and the short of it is
that these changes to the natural environment, and
policy responses to them, will also impact natural
resource production and consumption on a variety of
levels.
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The shift in the center of gravity of the global economy
will also continue to impact natural resources. The
arrival of China on the stage of global economic
powerhouses is by now a truism, but it is only one of
the key trends shaping the twenty-first century.25
Global trade has expanded from $5.5 trillion in 1998
to $16 trillion in 2012. The physical volume of stuff
traded has increased by 250 percent over the last
thirty years; 10 billion tons of goods are now traded,
many of them moving vast distances by ship, rail, and
truck.26 Robust economic growth in various corners
of the globe has also fed into and led to American and
European consumption habits being copied else-
where. Governance institutions and supply chains—
not to mention the natural environment—are being
stretched to cope with the desire of billions of earth’s
residents converging on consumption ideals that seek
not only a chicken in every pot, but a car in every
garage and a television in every room. The evidence
is striking:27
 Since 2008, non-OECD countries have consumed
more energy on an annual basis than the OECD. If
everyone in the world burned fossil fuels as
Americans do, CO2 emissions would increase by
400 percent.
 There are more people in the world now classified
as overweight (1.4 billion) than undernourished (842
million), and the shift to meat-heavy diets means ever
more land, water, and energy are required. One-third
of food produced in the world goes to waste.
 Global water use over the past century has grown
twice as fast as the population.
 Humans extract 50 percent more natural resources
than they did thirty years ago, and now pull the equiv-
alent to 41,000 Empire State Buildings by weight out
of the ground each year.
Of course, not everyone has seen or will see benefits
from this unbalanced growth, so that yawning global
inequality also impacts the resource nexus in
numerous ways.
There are also geopolitical shifts that make the current
situation different. The rising power of China, Russia’s
regional hegemonic posturing, and America’s shifting
focus to the Pacific carry with them important conse-
quences for natural resources. These are important
and well documented, from China’s investments in
Africa and naval maneuvers in the South China Sea
and Indian Ocean, to Russia in Ukraine, and U.S. base
building in the Philippines. But this just scratches the
surface of the political re-ordering that is occurring
globally and regionally. There are ninety democracies
in the world today, but the beginning of a transition to
democracy does not guarantee accountability of
leaders, functioning state institutions, inclusion of
marginalized communities, civil tranquility, etc. Indeed,
the order of the day in far too many places is violence
and migration, which are but two of the possible
scenarios that usually have clear ties to resource
issues. The headlines are filled with cases: North
Africa, Syria, South Sudan, Bangladesh, and else-
where.
The resource nexus offers a fresh look at these inter-
linkages and an analytical tool for dealing with both
the metrics of key technology developments and the
diverse security and governance ramifications. To
illustrate this approach in light of the theme of the
papers in this AICGS project, we now turn to the
issue of water.
Water-Related Challenges
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
Water is fundamental for human life and well-being.
While access to clean drinking water is a key UN
Millennium Development Goal and considered a
human right, the current provision is unsatisfactory for
some 750 million people lacking such access, and for
the 2.5 billion people without access to improved
sanitation.
The challenges of supplying 7 billion people with
clean and safe water, with a further 1 billion expected
by 2030, are likely to increase. Just 1 percent of the
world’s total supply of water is freshwater, with a high
proportion being badly managed, spoiled, and
polluted. Looking ahead, the growing middle class,
ongoing urbanization, and the risks of climate change
are all adding to the pressure.
Environmental research highlights the “planetary
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boundary” of transgressing the safe operating space
for using freshwater.28 Such freshwater flows and
use occur at the largest sub-global level in the major
river basins around the world, transforming the local
and regional challenges into international and global
ones. While rivers, lakes, reservoirs, and renewable
groundwater stores replenish a stream of “blue water”
to overall availability, wide-spread eutrophication from
agricultural fertilizers and land-use changes perturb
supply especially at a regional scale. Accordingly,
research seeks to estimate a maximum monthly with-
drawal as a percentage of mean monthly rivers
flows29 (which may change over the course of a year)
that’s being transgressed in some areas worldwide,
indeed with a lot of economic and security ramifica-
tions.
Environmental research also underlines water supply
as an essential service that can be derived from
ecosystems, if those are properly managed. Indeed,
the estimate for the value of total global ecosystem
services in 2011 is $125 trillion/year with losses over
the last few years in the order of approximately 10 -
15 percent and more deterioration going on.30 While
such monetary values may be contested for a number
of methodological and other reasons, the important
point to stress is that water is more than a constituent
to all those ecosystems (open ocean, coastal zones,
forests, grasslands, wetlands, lakes and rivers, desert,
tundra, ice, cropland, and urban ecosystems): the
supply of water is dependent on the ability of ecosys-
tems to perform both their regulatory and provisioning
functions as part of the wider natural capital that
underpins all economic activities.31
A resource nexus view may be helpful to deal with the
complexities of environmental change, water, and
supply issues. It is often placed centrally in the nexus
debate and is strongly interrelated with energy and
food, but also quite relevant for the use of minerals
and land. The interesting angle from a nexus perspec-
tive is the intersection with drivers for demand, secu-
rity of supply, governance, and innovation.
Analyzing the water challenges as part of a nexus
approach, therefore, are likely to allow better deci-
sion-making for cooperation across sectors, along
value chains, and for transboundary management
structures. That is also been the main message from
the 2014 Bonn conference on the resource nexus.32
More recently, business has become worried about
future access to water. Acknowledging the water
dependencies of many industrial processes and elec-
tricity generation, the water disclosure report33 can
be seen as a wake-up call. Conducted on behalf of
573 investors with assets of $60 trillion, it states that
68 percent of responding companies say water is a
substantial risk to their businesses. The perceived
risk is not just a short-term one: the data indicate that
business is more worried about long-term water
stress rather than responding to short-term droughts.
In contrast, the response strategy of water produc-
tivity and its implications for production and innova-
tion is not yet high on the priorities of strategic
management. (See Figure 3 on page 42.)
Wide-ranging efforts and investments will be needed
to improve water productivity, from stemming leaks to
making better use of recycled water on to collabo-
rating with users about overcoming wasteful
consumption of water. Are the utilities prepared to
meet such challenges? Are their regulatory agencies
and customers willing to accept a need for higher
investments and, most likely, higher downstream
costs for using water? A 2012 survey conducted on
behalf of The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that
most utilities will increase their investments but are
faced with a number of barriers and risks.34 Most
important will be changes in the behavior of regula-
tion, customers and consumers, and effective strate-
gies to cope with the risks of pollution and impacts of
changing weather patterns. Again, the nexus
perspective kicks-in here as a way of looking at water
in a more integrated manner and organize demand
management.
In a wider perspective research underpins the impor-
tance of water for economic growth and human devel-
opment. It’s a common misunderstanding to assess
the importance of resources according to their rela-
tive share in GDP (such as the share of the water
sector), which evidently would suggest a low rele-
vance. In contrast, it should be quite clear that water
(as is the case with other resources) affects the
economic performance of downstream manufacturing
sectors, services, and private consumption. A recent
OECD paper looks at market distortions and
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concludes that water shortages can have a devas-
tating impact—particularly in the near term and at a
local scale, with power outages, retirement of irri-
gated crop land, and unemployment.35 If societies
are unable to manage water much more sustainably,
this could become a significant drag on the economy. 
Looking at affected countries and regions such as
India, China, the MENA region, and many others
(including the southwestern U.S. and southern
Europe), the strategic implication is that relevant hubs
of the world economy are at risk. Water stress will
most certainly correlate with food stress in many
regions, and is likely to have an impact on electricity
generation, manufacturing, and extraction activities.
This article will analyze the implications for energy,
transboundary river management, and international
shipping lanes in subsequent sections below. 
Climate change is increasingly seen as a stress multi-
plier. If current trends continue, the world would warm
by 4°C by the end of this century, i.e., twice as much
as the commonly agreed 2°C target suggests.
Drawing upon IPCC findings, a recent report36
names the regions that are likely to experience a
decline in precipitation of 20-50 percent and others
with severe flooding risks, all contributing to
enhanced global food security issues and risks of
poverty, displacement, and migration as well as for
economic assets. The agriculture-water-food security
are probably most obvious in North Africa and the
Middle East,37 a region strongly dependent on virtual
water imports (i.e., water embedded in the trade of
agricultural commodities), but also in Central and
South Asia where irrigation-based agriculture and
groundwater pumping are common practices.
We conclude here in line with a previous paper38
that water-nexus related conflicts are likely to increase
and may escalate in a number of countries, many of
which are relevant for the global supply of strategic
materials or essential as suppliers of key product
components. The critical variables go beyond a stove-
pipe approach of water management and require a
wider analysis of how water is used as an input for
other purposes and how societies cope with the chal-
lenges of security and adaptive governance.
ACCESS TO WATER
Access to fresh water is considered a fundamental
human right by the United Nations. This normative
ideal hits up against the challenges of how to provi-
sion huge and growing urban populations with water,
especially as climate change alters the availability
equation in unpredictable ways.
There are now around 600 cities in the world with a
population of over 750,000. By 2050, there will be
more city dwellers than the entire world population of
2004. Population growth and the dramatic concen-
tration of people in urban areas pose a set of nexus-
related challenges, especially surrounding access to
clean, fresh water. Most urban population growth is
occurring in the poorest parts of the planet, and in
places where local water supplies are insufficient to
meet demand. Urban and industrial use of water is
projected to double by 2050.39 Poor people, mean-
while, pay more for the water they use than the rich:
the slum dwellers of Kibera in Nairobi, Kenya, who rely
on private vendors for their water, pay up to seven
times more per liter of water than a North American,
and fifty times more than their richer neighbors in
Nairobi.40 While the percentage of people living in
slums decreased over the last decade, the actual
number of slum dwellers increased over the same
period because cities are growing so rapidly.
This is a multi-layered challenge, then, for policy-
makers: one is infrastructural, in investing in supplies,
laying the pipes, building pump stations and treatment
facilities. But another more daunting challenge is
political, in securing access to water supplies located
in many instances long distances away from the city
itself, in other political jurisdictions. 
Water transfers, the process by which water is phys-
ically moved across basin boundaries from source to
consumer, are nothing new. In the early twentieth
century, Los Angeles tapped into Owens Valley water
(runoff from the Sierra Nevada) and the Colorado
River, both sources 200+ miles away, in legendary
fashion. Chinatown-esque scenarios are bound to set
the stage for conflicts in the future as cities dig
deeper and build pipes farther afield to meet the water
needs of growing populations. Mexico City, one of the
largest cities in the world, gets 43 percent of its water
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from inter-basin transfers over distances of up to 154
km, and 0.6 percent of the country’s electricity
production goes toward pumping the water over the
mountainous terrain to the Valley of Mexico.41
As for the transatlantic community, issues of water
provision in lesser developed countries have both
humanitarian and security ramifications. Consider this:
in 2010, nearly all of the megacities (greater than 10
million population) in the world experienced water
shortages of one form or another. As cities continue
to grow, their leaders will have no other choice but to
seek additional sources of fresh water (or risk social
unrest if they are unable to meet local needs). Yet the
means at their disposal are limited: additional with-
drawals from local sources such as groundwater,
rivers, and reservoirs, at some point are no longer
possible. Drawing from well outside the cities raises
the potential for conflict, especially between cities
and the farmers who depend on water as well and
who resent outsiders taking “their” water.
How those conflicts are resolved is highly dependent
on governance, but it does not take an overly fertile
imagination to envision regional flare-ups in which
struggles over water act at least as a stressor. Las
Vegas, Nevada, is faced with massive shortages of
the Colorado River water upon which it depends, and
billions are being spent to build a third intake pipe
under Lake Mead (the so-called “third straw,”42 and,
in the longer term, to pipe Great Basin groundwater
300 miles from northern Nevada. The latter project
has been hugely controversial with Native American
and environmental groups and is currently held up in
the courts. The potential for armed conflict over water
in Nevada is perhaps not great (Cliven Bundy
notwithstanding43), but water has been the genesis
for urban riots in various quarters of the world in
recent decades. For example, there are thirteen docu-
mented incidents of water violence and conflict in
Pakistan since 2001, much of it related to water allo-
cation in rural areas and municipal service delivery.44
The nexus approach is likely to facilitate thinking about
different water users and their needs, thereby helping
to establish participatory planning methods able to
deliver on the right to water.
WATER AND ENERGY
Energy and water go hand in hand. Everything from
making electricity to refining transportation fuels
requires water, while treating and conveying water
for human use requires large quantities of energy
(about 4 percent of U.S. power generation).
Meanwhile, the ways we use water in homes and
businesses use an even larger quantity of energy:
water heating and clothes washing and drying are
responsible for 14 percent of California’s electricity
consumption and 31 percent of natural gas consump-
tion, for example.45 Given the changes in the global
economy, political geography, and environment
described in previous sections, the water-energy
nexus will only grow in importance globally as
American and European lifestyles are replicated in
other parts of the world. These changes will pose
policymakers, businesses, and individuals with a host
of challenges. 
Fossil fuels require water in their production phases,
and newer “unconventional” forms of fossil fuel
extraction, such as hydraulic fracturing, require even
more water than their conventional counterparts.
Refining and processing of fuels such as oil, gas, and
uranium requires large quantities of water. Much of
the coal used in power generation is transported as
slurry—ground coal mixed with water—and coal is the
largest fuel source for electricity.46 Meanwhile, emis-
sions controls at power plants use water to extract
materials such sulfur, mercury, and CO2 from emis-
sions. Biofuels contain massive quantities of
“embodied water,” when one considers the amount of
water needed to grow the biomass and then process
it into combustible hydrocarbons. When irrigated corn
or soybeans are used to make bioethanol or biodiesel,
water use per gallon of fuel exceeds that of the equiv-
alent quantity of refined petroleum by a factor of
1,000 or more.47 (See Figure 4 on page 42.)
Electricity production is a major user of fresh water.
In the U.S., upward of 90 percent of electricity is
produced using thermally driven water-cooled energy
conversion (thermoelectric power plants),48 while the
remaining power generation comes from hydroelec-
tric dams, solar panels, and wind turbines.
Thermoelectric plants use 39 percent of all water
withdrawals in the U.S., with only agriculture requiring
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a larger percentage.49 Much of this use is not
consumptive, since most of the water used for cooling
or turning turbines is not lost to evaporation, but some
is, and the water leaves the plant warmer than when
it entered. Both thermoelectric and hydroelectric
plants require dependable access to water. 
As water becomes more precious, the water-energy
nexus becomes more apparent. Periods of droughts
can lead to blackouts in electricity, or put electricity
production at risk. The shutdown of nuclear power
plants in France in 2003 may serve as an example.
Furthermore, water-stressed regions in the Middle
East, Australia, and North America are looking to
desalination as a means of ensuring stable supplies
of freshwater. Desalination is an extremely energy-
intensive method to obtain freshwater, and the saltier
the water, the more energy-intensive it is. In California,
there are seventeen desalination plants in the plan-
ning stage, with the largest plant in the Western
Hemisphere under construction at Carlsbad near San
Diego.50 California’s recent drought has led farmers
to intensify their groundwater withdrawals in the
Central Valley, so that water-intensive high value
crops such as almonds can continue to be harvested,
while coastal communities attempt to speed progress
toward desalination as a silver bullet to deal with
growing demand amid constrained supplies. In April
2015, Governor Jerry Brown announced mandatory
25 percent cuts to municipal water providers but
spared farmers, who account for 80 percent of the
state’s water use.
In the Persian Gulf region, several countries have
embarked on plans to construct nuclear power plants.
The UAE signed contracts with a South Korean
consortium to build four reactors by 2020, with a total
capacity of 5.6 gigawatts.51 The original feasibility
study for developing nuclear power capacity in the
Gulf cited desalination as a major need for the addi-
tional energy capacity need. 
Like California, much of Brazil has faced an epic
drought last year, its worst in eighty years. Despite
being the country with the largest volume of fresh-
water in the world—12 percent of the global total—
the geography of Brazil has most of the population in
the south and most of the fresh water in the north,
while high inter- and intra-annual variability of rainfall
make planning for water shortages challenging.
Shortages and extreme heat have affected many of
the country’s key commodities, including coffee,
sugar, soy, and beef.52 There are numerous ripple
effects of drought on energy production in Brazil.
Reservoirs in southeastern Brazil (close to the major
population centers of Rio and Sao Paulo) produce
most of the country’s hydroelectric power, which
accounts for two-thirds of electricity generation.
Dramatically low water levels could lead to electricity
rationing in the country if conditions do not improve,
and a massive blackout in January 2015 may be a
harbinger of future challenges. The causes of the
drought are undoubtedly complex, but deforestation
is emerging in the scientific community as a major
culprit. Amazonia’s forests churn huge quantities of
water vapor into the air, described as “flying rivers,”
which then circulate elsewhere in South America
providing a moisture source for otherwise dry areas.53
So the sinister nexus scenario is thus: deforesting
the Amazon to advance an agricultural frontier so that
farmers may grow soybeans and sugar, much of
which goes toward Brazil’s massive and growing
appetite for beef and biofuels, may in fact be cutting
off the water that supplies not only the megacities of
South America with water, but also much of the elec-
tricity fueling its economic growth. One can easily
see how social unrest would result from drought-
induced brownouts. 
In short, water and energy are thoroughly integrated,
yet they are not treated as such by policies and
markets. Water efficiency measures are de facto
energy saving measures, and the waste of either of
these resources constitutes waste of the other. The
resource nexus suggests that accounting for the
interlinkages across these resources, and numerous
others, would have benefits in a variety of realms,
bolstering human security and national security while
also making markets more efficient and making a dent
in anthropogenic climate change.54
TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER MANAGEMENT
In 2012, the National Intelligence Council released a
study that began with the following sobering state-
ment: “We assess that during the next 10 years, water
problems will contribute to instability in states impor-
tant to U.S. national security interests. Water short-
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ages, poor water quality, and floods by themselves are
unlikely to result in state failure. However, water prob-
lems—when combined with poverty, social tensions,
environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership,
and weak political institutions—contribute to social
disruptions that can result in state failure.”55
The report paid particular attention to transboundary
rivers, and concluded that water in shared basins was
likely to become more politicized as demand
increases and climate change alters its availability. It
further said that transboundary water was likely to be
used by terrorists to further their causes in coming
years.
Indeed, although there are legion examples of coop-
eration between states that share transboundary
water resources, such as rivers and lakes, the
centrality of water to life, transportation, energy gener-
ation, and agriculture, also provides ample tinder for
conflict as well. Hydropolitics are central to the
resource nexus. The strength of institutions designed
to manage water resources across boundaries,
meanwhile, varies widely across geographic contexts,
as do vulnerability and resilience to changes that
occur naturally or artificially that affect water
resources.56 A host of factors impact transboundary
rivers and a population’s ability to utilize the resource,
from upstream dam building, to pollution, to drought
and floods (and the management of drought and
flood). Some changes occur rapidly, others over long
time spans. While certain ripple effects of changes
can easily be predicted, others are incredibly difficult
to model and predict. Because transboundary rivers
involve state security and sovereignty, incentives to
cooperate and negotiate are too often trumped by
political gamesmanship and hubris.
Positive examples of transboundary cooperation on
issues of water management include several from the
transatlantic community. The Columbia River Treaty,
for example, has governed relations between the U.S.
and Canada over the Columbia since the 1950s, and
has generally been viewed as a positive example of
collaborative management of transboundary water,
although it is worth noting that after 2024 the treaty
may be renegotiated or terminated by either side.57
The European Union requires every member state to
work with neighboring states on managing water
resources through its Water Framework Directive,
and the history of managing the European river of the
Danube also dates back to times of the Cold War.
Both examples highlight the role that institutions play
in successfully managing competing demands and
interests and avoiding conflict, which is not to say
that in either North America or the EU that conflict
over water is out of the question.
Several additional cases outside transatlantic space
serve to highlight transboundary water issues and
how the resource nexus can help shed light on them. 
The Nile Basin covers 3.2 million square kilometers,
spanning 35 degrees of latitude and eleven coun-
tries. The river is the basis for Egypt’s economy and
population, but most of its flow originates in upstream
states, especially Ethiopia, where an estimated 82-95
percent of the water comes from in the form of runoff
from the highlands to Nile tributaries.58 There are
tremendous growing pressures on the Nile’s water
resources and on the institutions that currently govern
the river. Population is growing in the basin, its waters
are increasingly being viewed by Ethiopia and Sudan
as an engine of economic development in the form of
hydro power, and climate change is impairing water
availability in the basin. The Nile Waters Agreement of
1959, which currently governs the river’s water allo-
cations, only has Sudan and Egypt as signatories,
and other upstream countries view it skeptically and
have pursued their own instruments to govern the
river.59
Enter Ethiopia and its ambitious Grand Renaissance
Dam. Ethiopia is a largely agrarian country that never-
theless has seen double digit growth rates recently.60
The dam is being built on the main stream of the Blue
Nile near the country’s border with Sudan, and its
6,000 MW of generating capacity is part of the
government’s plan to lift much of the population out
of poverty by 2025. Egypt has voiced numerous
concerns about the dam’s possible impacts on flows
in the Nile, and some, including former Prime Minister
Mohamed Morsi, have used bellicose language
toward Ethiopia. What is clear is that the new dam will
have not only impacts on the flow downstream upon
which Egyptian agriculture depends, but also impacts
on electricity generation at existing Nile dams in
Sudan and Egypt.
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South and Southeast Asia present further, even more
complex, cases of the resource nexus and hydropol-
itics.61 China’s downstream states, basically all of
the countries in mainland South and Southeast Asia,
depend on rivers rising in China and are worried
about China’s massive dam construction and the
impact this will have on both the quantity and quality
of water flowing through their territories. The major
rivers of these regions all originate on the Tibetan
Plateau, and climate change threatens source waters
because of glacier melt. More immediately, perhaps,
the spate of dam building on the Mekong poses a
serious challenge to downstream populations that
depend on fisheries, dependable flow patterns, and
silt and nutrients to sustain agriculture. While the
Mekong River Commission (MRC) is a reasonably
successful multilateral institution governing the river
basin, China—which of course manages the head-
waters and three provinces of the country through
which the river flows—only participates in the MRC as
a “dialogue partner.” China’s seven megadams and
twenty further planned dams are a source of serious
downstream concern, but even downstream states
are planning or constructing an additional eleven
hydro dams.62 A bevy of research suggests that the
dam building will have negative impacts on food secu-
rity—fisheries and agriculture—in Southeast Asia.
Plus, the plans require energy and materials for their
construction and will have impacts on regional
ecosystems. Looking at water and energy issues as
well as at other resource interlinkages in a more inte-
grated manner, the nexus approach is likely to
enhance risk analysis and facilitate the deliberation for
solutions in transboundary river management across
scales.
WATERWAYS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND
MARITIME SECURITY
There is yet another dimension related to water and
the resource nexus that should be of interest: the
world’s oceans and the many waterways used for
shipping and international trade.
Again, this is not entirely new. Dating back to the
Bible, mankind always has had a strong religious and
symbolic notion of oceans. The ancient Romans
called “Mare Nostrum” what is today the
Mediterranean Sea, considering it a homeland for
their citizens. What’s relevant today is the amount of
goods traded on international shipping lanes and the
erosion of an international order that was established
after World War II. 
Some 80 percent of all goods traded internationally
use international shipping lanes according to
UNCTAD data. Oil, coal, iron ore, bauxite and other
aluminum pre-products, phosphate, and a few other
commodities make up for roughly one-third of inter-
national maritime trade measured by tonnage, with
staple goods, mass goods, and containers
contributing other significant shares. The share of
containers is rising constantly due to international
supply chains, and one may also expect a rise in lique-
fied natural gas (LNG).
The environmental importance of the oceans is
increasingly recognized.63 Research shows that
being used as sinks for waste—including chemical
hazardous substances such as persistent organic
pollutants (POPs), radioactive waste, and plastics—
gives alarming signals about acidification, warming,
and the pollution of oceans. The waste water dimen-
sion is especially important from a nexus perspective,
as nutrients flowing into the oceans cannot easily be
recovered and contribute to lower yields in fishery
and other parts of the food chains. No surprise that
the estimations about the world’s natural capital give
oceans and coastal ecosystems highest values.64
There are high the expectations about using the
oceans and the seabeds as a future source for extrac-
tion of energy and materials. Existing processes
feature sand and gravel extraction used for many
construction purposes, but also diamonds, pearls,
salt, manganese, and gas hydrates. Future seabed
mining is seen as lucrative because the quantity of
minerals occupying the ocean floor is potentially large.
The EU is fascinated about a future “blue growth,”65
while companies with illustrative names such as
“Nautilus Minerals Inc.” have started activities all over
the world.
Besides environmental concerns about potentially
negative impacts and safety and health issues, there
are also severe maritime security ramifications that
need to be considered. 
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The rise of China to exploit the “string of pearls,” a
colloquial term for Chinese-funded ports and related
infrastructure along the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
becomes more and more visible. It stretches from
small islands such as the Kingdom of Tonga in the
South Pacific on to the Indian Ocean and the
European port of Piraeus. One may expect raw mate-
rial partnerships to arise that give China a preferred
exploration right or access to seabeds located in the
200 mile zones of those areas.
Gunboat diplomacy continues in the Chinese Seas.
The Chinese claims on “their” South and East China
Seas are antagonizing the neighbors in Japan, the
Philippines, and Vietnam. The now more nationalist
government in Japan has started to develop a tough
position. With historians such as Herfried Muenkler
reminding us that the Great War emerged out of a
similar constellation in Europe in 1914,66 one should
clearly be worried about what potentially could esca-
late into a serious confrontation. Access to the mani-
fold resources is clearly one of the driving forces in
this conflict. (See Figure 5 on page 43.)
What also adds to the picture are asymmetric threats
such as piracy and maritime terrorism along essential
choke points of international shipping.67 Piracy in and
around the Strait of Malacca has been on the rise
recently, despite accounts of ongoing stringent meas-
ures by the concerned littorals. The situation off the
West African Gulf of Guinea is also serious. Piracy off
Somalia has been another example of the maritime
consequences of instability and lawlessness on land,
albeit the situation there has become slightly better
since 2011. With volatile adjoining regions, one may
expect more “professional” types of piracy with more
engagements of terrorists and international organized
crime using ungovernable spaces as territory.
We have called this a “redux of the resource curse”68:
triggered by the emergence of a food and/or water
crisis—whatever the causes may be—local and
national governance mechanisms are vulnerable and
may not be able to cope with such a shock. If people
start rioting for access to water and food and if the
existing institutional resilience is low, fragile states
and regions will be put at risk of further instability,
where the mechanisms of piracy, fundamentalism,
secessionism, terrorism, and organized crime might
escalate. Any such escalation may then lead to inter-
ruptions of supply chains for essential materials and
have international repercussions.
To a certain extent, shipping is immune to security
risks because if one area of the ocean becomes
unsafe then ships will re-route. For example, if Suez
becomes impassible, then it would be possible for
more ships to go around Africa. In the present market
there may even be enough spare capacity for this to
happen with only a minimal impact on freight rates.
Industry now uses Automatic Identification System
(AIS), which enables the positioning of vessels as
they move around the globe. The other way that the
industry has dealt with piracy is just to treat it as an
insurance cost—plenty of operators who are still
actively trading with, for example, East Africa charge
a higher price and buy back the ship with ransom
money if it is captured. There is also a rise in the use
of privately contracted armed security personnel
(PCASP). That’s not to say that there are not strategic
sea lanes; clearly a conflict that blocks the Straits of
Hormuz and Malacca would be enormously disruptive
to world oil supply and other value chains.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is
actively dealing with those issues. They host a registry
of piracy incidents and security arrangements. For
the Strait of Malacca, for instance, it shows 148
allegedly committed attacks, 40 attempted attacks,
and further 405 incidents without a geographical
position system. There are amendments to the 1974
Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), the most
far-reaching of which enshrined the International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which
contains detailed security-related requirements for
governments, port authorities, and shipping compa-
nies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a
series of guidelines about how to meet these require-
ments in a second, non-mandatory section (Part B).
Regional cooperation among states has an important
role to play, too, as evident through the Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (RECAAP) and
the Djibouti Code of Conduct. In addition, there is an
unprecedented international mobilization of maritime
security coalition between the EU naval forces of
Operation Atalanta, plus two U.S. and NATO task
forces, along with ships from other countries (China,
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Japan, South Korea, and Russia).
A main root cause for piracy, however, is the poverty
and lack of livelihood along major coastlines that moti-
vates people to join criminal gangs. It is here where
the resource nexus might become a key abatement
strategy: securing a better management for water,
energy, and food in rural areas is probably the best
strategy to minimize the risks of piracy and environ-
mental degradation. It is here where the action
emerging for a sustainable energy for all, a right to
water, a responsible supply chain management, low
carbon shipping, and eco-innovations shall converge.
Conclusions
The resource nexus raises a number of challenges for
international security. It deepens existing conflicts and
leads to new ones. 
Quite often, water is at the heart of such dynamic
instabilities. The provision of water is essential for
energy production and a number of industrial
processes, for human life, and for the provision of
ecosystems services that are essential for food
production. The resource nexus helps to understand
which resources depend on a well-functioning water
provision, what risks may emerge in case of distur-
bances, and what opportunities may arise from
crossing the silos of water, energy, and others. If soci-
eties are unable to manage water much more sustain-
ably, this could become a significant drag on the
economy. 
The security implications are manifold. Water has
been the genesis for urban riots in various quarters of
the world in recent decades, with nexus ramifications
amplifying outbreaks of fundamentalism, piracy,
terrorism, threats for supply chain security and home-
land security, and international conflicts.
Probably most important is to understand the
resource nexus as a preventive tool to understand
such interlinkages and translate them into action on
the ground where business, citizens, and policy coali-
tions have a role to play to minimize risks and turn
them into opportunities for sustainable resource
management. The transatlantic policy toolbox should
be widened to include resource efficiency, supply
chain security, and greening international trade.
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